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NEWS FROM THE COURTS
Grava v. INS, Ninth Circuit 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that persecution inflicted because of one’s activities in exposing government corruption can be persecution on the basis of political opinion and can thus form the basis for an asylum claim.<ぐ颵ᇏ芻ꨀ봀௎噓�۷?譗Ѿ੷譟廎沔> 
Dionesio Grava was a policeman in the Philippines.  Throughout his career he was especially active in exposing corruption involving government officials.  One time the authorities discovered Grava’s own investigation into smuggling by the head of the customs service.  Grava assisted with this investigation, despite being an officer with the customs service and having been told to stay out of it by his boss.  Grava’s involvement in the investigation was well publicized.  Shortly after this he began receiving threatening phone calls, his car was damaged, his pets were poisoned, and he received death threats.  He fled to the US with his family. 
Grava filed an asylum application that was denied by an Immigration Judge and then the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Their position was that Grava’s activities – essentially acting as a whistleblower – was not an expression of political opinion, so the persecution he suffered could not be on the basis of political opinion.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that in some circumstances, whistleblower activities can be political.  According to the court, when the corruption exposed is “inextricably intertwined with governmental operation,” rather than the result of the actions of a single corrupt government official, exposing the corruption can be a political act.  The court remanded the case to an Immigration Judge to determine whether Grava was persecuted because of political opinion under the standard announced. 
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Kumar v. INS, Ninth Circuit 
Sashi Lata Kumar entered the US without inspection in 1991.  She applied for asylum, claiming she had been persecuted on the basis of political opinion in her native Fiji.  She claimed that in 1986, when she was 21, her father was politically active in the opposition party, and that she often assisted him.  This party was elected to power, but in 1987 was removed from power in a coup.  The coup was not violent. 
After the coup, soldiers came to the family’s home.  They tied up Kumar’s parents and beat them.  They stripped her clothes off and fondled her in front of her parents.  They told her father that he would be beaten again if he continued his political activities, and told her that if her father did not stop, they would kill her.  The family went to the police, who did nothing.  A few weeks later the father was arrested and detained for two weeks, during which time he was severely beaten.  
A few months later, when Kumar and her mother were worshipping at a Hindu temple, a group of soldiers entered and began breaking religious statues and burning books.  Kumar was dragged out of the temple and was beaten.  The soldiers demanded that she convert to Christianity, and to make the beating stop, she agreed.  Later that year she was beaten unconscious by soldiers while on her way home from school.  After this, her family sent her to Canada where she unsuccessfully sought refuge.  After being denied in Canada, she entered the US. 
An Immigration Judge denied her application for asylum.  He based this decision on the changed conditions in Fiji.  He also ruled that the persecution she suffered was not so egregious as to warrant a grant of asylum for humanitarian reasons, despite the changed country conditions.  
The Ninth Circuit agreed.  It found that while Kumar had been persecuted, the changed conditions in Fiji meant she no longer had a reasonable fear of being persecuted if returned to Fiji.  It then determined that Kumar did not deserve humanitarian asylum because what she endured was not as horrifying as what was suffered by the petitioner in another asylum case – repeated beatings, being sent to a reeducation camp, seeing a family member shoved into a bonfire.  In ruling that Kumar did not deserve humanitarian asylum, and doing so by comparing her case to the facts of another, the court made the persecution suffered in this other case the minimum required to obtain a grant of humanitarian asylum.   
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Innab v. Reno, Eleventh Circuit 
In this case, the court ruled that section 440(d) of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which made foreign nationals convicted of certain crimes ineligible for waivers of deportation, could not be applied retroactively to cases in which a request for a waiver was pending when the AEDPA became effective. 
For the most part, this case is similar to cases from other courts reaching the same conclusion.  However, there is discussion of some points that have not yet been determinative in such cases, but may become so in the future. 
Innab was convicted in 1987 on a misdemeanor weapons charge, and in 1992 of possession of cocaine.  In 1994 the INS began deportation proceedings on the basis of these convictions.  Innab sought a waiver of deportation, and also began working to reverse his state court convictions.  The 1987 conviction was reversed because the trial judge found the changes in immigration law defeated the purpose of Innab’s guilty plea.  Innab claimed his 1992 conviction was reversed on the same basis.  Innab argued that because both of his convictions were reversed, he was no longer deportable.  He further argued that by ignoring the action of the state court, the federal government was violating the Tenth Amendment, which provides that powers not specifically granted to the federal government are granted to the states.  The government did not challenge the fact that both of his convictions were overturned, nor did it officially address these arguments.  It did, however, state to the court during oral arguments that because the state court reversed the convictions solely to avoid deportation, it violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which provides that where state and federal law differ, federal law controls.  Because these arguments were not fully developed, the court ordered that they be presented to the district court.  This resolution of this argument will be very important as more people facing deportation return to their court of conviction to reverse their convictions. 
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Chavez v. Reno, District of Massachusetts 
In this case, the judge ordered a deportation order to be stayed so that Chavez could pursue a motion to reopen his case before the Board of Immigration Appeals.<ぐ颵ᇏ芻ꨀ봀௎噓�۷?譗Ѿ੷譟廎沔> 
Chavez, a native of Cape Verde, is a permanent resident who has lived in the US since 1987, when he was 11 years old.  In 1994 and 1995 he was convicted of cocaine possession in Massachusetts state court, and in 1996 was placed in deportation proceedings.  He was ruled ineligible for a waiver of deportation because of retroactive application of a section of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.  An Immigration Judge ordered him deported.  Chavez then went to the court of where he was convicted and successfully had the 1994 conviction vacated.  He then appealed his deportation order, arguing that because the conviction was vacated, he was no longer an aggravated felon.  The Board agreed, but found his 1995 conviction sufficient for deportation under a different provision.  The Board also found that he was ineligible to apply for a waiver of deportation.  
Chavez then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the district court.  While this case was pending, the trial court vacated his second conviction on the basis that he had not been fully informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  He then filed a motion to terminate the deportation proceedings and a motion to reopen the case before the Board. 
The INS argued that even though Chavez’ convictions were vacated, they remained convictions for immigration purposes.  It based this argument on a BIA case ruling that deferred adjudications and other situations in which a conviction was removed after the fulfillment of certain conditions such as probation and community service were nonetheless convictions for immigration purposes.  The district court found this line of reasoning inapplicable to the case at hand.  Chavez’ convictions were vacated because he was not properly informed of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, and Massachusetts law specifically requires a defendant to be informed of such consequences. 
Therefore, the district court ordered the deportation order be stayed while Chavez pursues his case before the Board of Immigration Appeals.