FEDERAL COURT ALLOWS 1986 AMNESTY LITIGATION TO PROCEED

Catholic Social Services v. INS, Ninth Circuit

In this case, the court allowed a class action suit relating to the 1986 amnesty to proceed.

In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).  This law granted amnesty to undocumented aliens in the US who could show that they had been in the US since 1982 except for “brief, casual, and innocent absences.”  There was a one-year period to apply for benefits under IRCA, between May 5, 1987 and May 5, 1988.  In November 1986, the INS issued an interpretation of the “brief, casual, and innocent” absence.  Under it, anyone who left the US after November 6, 1986 without obtaining advance parole was not eligible for adjustment of status under IRCA.

As soon as the INS announced this position, a lawsuit challenging it was filed.  It was certified as a class action encompassing all persons eligible for legalization under IRCA who left the US without advance parole.  The court found that the INS interpretation was inconsistent with the law and issued several remedial orders.  Among these was that the INS extend the application period until November 1988.  The INS appealed, not on the merits, but based on the remedial orders.  The court was affirmed, and the INS appealed to the US Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court found that the case was not “ripe,” a legal term meaning that the situation was not sufficiently developed for there to be a real dispute before the court.

In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add specific plaintiffs whose applications for legalization were rejected because of the physical presence requirement, as well as plaintiffs who did not make an application because of it.  The district court found that it had jurisdiction and issued remedial orders similar to those it first issued.  The INS appealed.

While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).  Section 377 of the IIRAIRA eliminated federal court jurisdiction of claims related to the physical presence unless the person suing actually did file or attempted to file an application.  Based on this law, in 1998 the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court and ordered the trial court to dismiss the case.

Shortly after the dismissal, the plaintiffs filed another case, clearly specifying that members of the class included people who met the requirements in section 377.  The district court certified a class composed of people who were eligible for legalization but whose applications were rejected because of travel outside the US after November 6, 1988.  The INS argued that the court could not hear the case because of the expiration of the statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations in actions against the government is six years.  The district court allowed the case to go forward, the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 

The Ninth Circuit first noted that it should not have ordered the case dismissed, but instead should have given the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint.  It was this action that made the statute of limitations an issue.  The court found that the statute of limitations had been tolled during the first case, based on principles announced the two Supreme Court cases.  The purpose of statutes of limitations is to promote fairness by requiring actions be brought when memories of them are fresh, and evidence is still available.  The purpose of class actions is to promote efficiency by litigating similar claims in one case.  In addressing a case filed by an individual plaintiff after the dismissal of a similar class action lawsuit after the statute of limitations had passed, the Supreme Court allowed the case to go forward, finding that the “commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations” for subsequent actions by people who could have been members of the class.  Under this principle, it is clear that if the members of the current class had filed their claims individually rather than as a class, they would be allowed to proceed.  The Ninth Circuit found that this principle encompassed the present case, and ruled that it was not barred by the statute of limitations.

The court then addressed the remedial orders the district court had issued.  It first had to address the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the IIRAIRA, and found that none of them prevented the court from hearing the case nor did they prevent the district court from issuing remedial orders.  The district court had issued an order prohibiting the INS from deporting any class members, and declined to issue an order allowing the plaintiffs to litigate the issue of whether IIRAIRA section 337 violated equal protection because of the Ninth Circuit’s previous dismissal of the case.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the order preventing the INS from initiating deportation proceedings.  The court reversed the district court’s decision that it could not address the equal protection issue.  In its decision to dismiss the case based on section 337, the Ninth Circuit did not address the equal protection argument, finding only that the plaintiffs were prevented from pursuing their case because of it.  Because the issue had not been previously litigated, the Ninth Circuit now ruled that the plaintiffs could make the equal protection argument before the district court.
 
The opinion is available online at http://laws.findlaw.com/9th/9816269.html.

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