Jorge Esparza-Mendoza, a national of Mexico, filed a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment, seeking to suppress his identification card and his identity and all information related to his prior deportation. He also sought to suppress incriminating comments he made to the arresting officer and the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) agent. The United States District Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, found that Esparza-Mendoza was not in the community protected by the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion.

Esparza-Mendoza entered the United States illegally around March 1997. He was convicted of felony possession of cocaine in a state court in Utah on April 19, 1999. He waived an opportunity to contest the deportation and the INS ordered that he be removed with instructions that his return to the country would result in criminal consequences.

Later, Esparza-Mendoza again entered the country illegally. Following an altercation between two other people, an officer requested to see Esparza-Mendoza’s identification although she did not believe that he had committed any crime. He reluctantly offered his identification. A quick check led the officer to realize his status and that there was a warrant on him if he re-entered the country. The officer then detained Esparza-Mendoza and the United States charged him with illegal entry.

The court rejected the government’s claim that Esparza-Mendoza was not detained. Following INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984), when the Supreme Court stated it would find a detention “if the [questioned person] refuses to answer and the police takes additional steps…to obtain an answer.” The court held that here, Esparza-Mendoza refused to answer and the police officer took the additional step of directing him to answer. The court also held that there was no reasonable suspicion by the officer, which is the only appropriate reason for detention. The court found that Esparza-Mendoza was detained without reasonable suspicion, and therefore, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Since ruling on the suppression of individual claims would not fully resolve the case, the court confronted the threshold issue raised by the United States of whether Esparza-Mendoza, as a previously removed illegal alien and aggravated felon who illegally re-entered the United States, belongs to the community of person covered by the phrase “the people” in the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects “the rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures…”

The Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), determined that “the people…refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” Yet, the decision was not without controversy, with some courts feeling that the language of the opinion was too broad to follow. However, the court said that the language was so intertwined in the controlling opinion that it must apply the “sufficient connection” test to determine the rights of Esparza-Mendoza.

The court then differentiates between “the people” and other references to persons in other amendments. To back up this theory, the court relies on a law review article by Akhil Reed Amar, which indicates that “the people” is a reference to prospective jurors, voters, and others who are sufficiently attached to the political community. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 889, 892-93; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 64-77 (1998).

Esparza-Mendoza chose to not present any evidence, such as employment records, at the trial to indicate his ties to the country. The court therefore held that he was not “sufficiently attached” to the community to gain Constitutional rights, including those guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.