The State of New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele

Cheshire-Hillsborough County                            

Jaffrey-Peterborough District Court

Nashua District Court

Decided August 12, 2005

This case involves an Order on Motions to Dismiss and Objections filed by Defendants in response to criminal trespass charges based on novel trespass theory and filed by the New Ipswich Police Department in New Hampshire.   According to New Hampshire RSA 635:2, a person is guilty of trespass as a violation if that person knowingly remains or enters a place in which he has no license or privileged to do so.  The eight Defendants charged in this case are all illegal aliens, initially engaged by officers for reasons other than trespass, but were later charged with criminal trespass because they were knowingly in the United States, more specifically the towns of New Ipswich and Hudson, without proper documentation or privileged to enter and had not taken steps to lawfully enter and remain.   The New Hampshire Court granted all Motions and dismissed all criminal charges based on the application of RSA 635:2 in a manner that violates the Supremacy Clause.

In its analysis of the charges, the Court looked at the federal powers granted by the Supremacy Clause, of the United States, Article IV, cl.2 as well as the federal laws governing naturalization adopted by Congress pursuant to U.S. Constitution Article 1, §8 that preempt state action to regulate immigration.  The Court used the test of constitutionality, established by the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). The De Canas case sets forth the criteria for determining whether a state law, or its application, is an unconstitutional entry into an area preempted by federal law.  The criteria are as follows: (1) whether the federal law explicitly preempts state regulation in the area; (2) whether state law infringes on an area where Congress intended federal law to have complete jurisdiction absent specific preemption; (3) whether the state law conflicts with the federal law.

First, the Court recognized that Congress expressed its central concern in the Immigration & Naturalization Act (“INA”) that the terms and conditions of admission and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country be the exclusive province of federal law.  The Court stated in its reasoning that the mere fact that RSA 635:2 was applied to the illegal aliens is not unconstitutional because there is no explicit prohibition in the INA to state involvement in the treatment of aliens since past cases have held that states may regulate matters affecting the employment of aliens.  Thus, the first of the criteria, as held in the De Canas case, allows for certain state regulations in the area of immigration.

However, the Court held based on the second criteria Congress intended federal law to “occupy the field” of violations and penalties for illegal entry into the country pursuant to the scheme set forth in the INA.  The Court found that the federal scheme detailing the array of offenses, sanction and penalties is so pervasive that it allows no room for States to supplement it.  Therefore, state sanctions in the same area are not permitted.

Finally, the Court held that, based on the foregoing, the State law, as applied in the instant case, clearly conflicts with the federal statutory scheme.  Thus, the criminal trespass charges were unconstitutional attempts to regulate in an area occupied exclusively by federal schemes of enforcement for immigration violations and were in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  Therefore, the Court dismissed all charges against the eight Defendants.

The court noted that this finding does not preclude efforts by local law enforcement officials to participate and assist in the enforcement of the federal laws governing immigration violations.