The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided the case of Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez.  The Court granted Certiorari, vacating the case, and remanding it back to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  The decision, written by Justice Breyer, held that “theft offense,” for which alien may be removed, includes crime of “aiding and abetting” a theft offense, and violation of California statute prohibiting taking vehicle without consent was “theft offense.”  

The facts of the case are as follows:  Respondent Duenas-Alvarez was convicted of violating Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §10851(a), which states that “…any person who is a party or an accessory to an accomplice in the driving (of a vehicle) or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense.”  

After Duenas-Alvarez was convicted, the Federal Government, claiming that the conviction was for a generic theft offense, began removal proceedings.  A federal Immigration Judge, agreeing with the Government that the California offense is “a theft offense…for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year,” found Duesas-Alvarez removable.  Any “theft offense” may subject an alien to removal.  

Duenas-Alvarez argued that §10851 holds liable accessories after the fact and to prove that n individual was an accessory after the fact does not require the government to show that the individual committed a theft.  Second, the respondent argues that §10851 applies to “joyriding,” which he argues involves so limited a deprivation of the use of a car that it falls outside the generic “theft” definition.   

These claims from the respondent were not considered; the question that the Supreme Court agreed to decide is whether “theft offense” in the federal statute “includes aiding and abetting the commission of the offense.”  Since neither of respondent’s claims fall within this line of questioning, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.