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NEWS FROM THE COURTS
Aguilar-Solis v. INS, First Circuit
In this case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a Board of Immigration Appeals order of deportation over the immigrant Aguilar-Solis’ claims that the Immigration Judge’s handling of his hearing denied him due process and that the Immigration Judge erred in denying his asylum claim, finding he did not establish either past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution.
In reviewing the transcript of the hearing, the First Circuit found no behavior by the Immigration Judge that could be called a due process violation; indeed, "even if viewed through a jaundiced eye, the transcript reflects nothing more sinister than a modicum of impatience." 
The First Circuit also upheld the rejection of his asylum claim. Aguilar-Solis’ family was only marginally involved in politics during El Salvador’s civil war. The family home was destroyed, but the record did not reveal who was responsible. In 1985 guerrillas killed Aguilar-Solis’ brother; after this he fled to the U.S. and entered without inspection. 
In 1990, he returned to El Salvador to marry a woman he met in the U.S. Before leaving, he bought a fraudulent green card. Because of this, the Immigration Judge found his testimony lacking in credibility. The only past persecution he was able to establish was that that an entire country suffers during times of civil war, and given the current conditions in El Salvador, Aguilar-Solis was unable to establish a reasonable fear of future persecution. All the events he used to support his claim occurred prior to 1992, when the government and guerrilla forces signed a general peace accord.
 
 
Ayache v. INS, Sixth Circuit
In this case the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmation of an Immigration Judge’s denial of the immigrant Ayache’s motion to reopen.
Hana Ali Ayache, a citizen of Lebanon, came to the U.S. as a visitor in 1993. She overstayed her visa and in 1995 was ordered to show cause why she should not be deported. She conceded deportability and asked for a 30-day extension to file an asylum application. This was granted but she later withdrew the application and requested voluntary departure. She violated the period allowed for voluntary departure, was arrested, and granted bond on the condition that she leave the U.S. One day before she was scheduled to leave she filed a motion to reopen her case so she could again file an application for asylum. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, finding she did not present sufficient evidence that was previously unavailable. The BIA affirmed.
The First Circuit found it an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to reopen. Ayache presented evidence that she worked as a nurse in southern Lebanon, tending to Israeli soldiers, and evidence of a warrant issued for her arrest, after the initial hearing. She also presented a letter from the mayor of a town in south Lebanon order her presence at an interrogation on charges of cooperating with Israel. 
This evidence, the Sixth Circuit found, was significant enough to warrant reopening the case for an asylum hearing.
 
 
Chitay-Pirir v. INS, Seventh Circuit
In this case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of an Immigration Judge, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, that Chitay-Pirir, an asylum applicant, had not established past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution. 
Chitay-Pirir entered the U.S. without inspection in 1996, fleeing Guatemala. He was 15 years old. When he was apprehended, at age 16, he made an application for asylum. As the Seventh Circuit said, "he made a plausible case." His family was a member of a group of Amerindians living in the provinces who sided with the guerrillas during the county’s 25-year civil war. He established that his father had been murdered by a death squad, with an uncle and a cousin also meeting the same fate. At age 13, Chitay-Pirir joined the guerrillas; he deserted after three months, but the government knew of his participation. He went into hiding in Guatemala City, where he remained until coming to the U.S.
At his initial hearing, when he was 16 years old and in custody of the INS, he was represented by an attorney, but also requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The BIA denied the request, noting that he was represented and was "living with an adult relative." While finding that the failure to appoint a guardian was not an error, the BIA did make factual misstatements in its opinion that warranted reversal. In addition to the error in considering INS detention to be living with an adult relative, the BIA asserted that the people responsible for the murders of Chitay-Pirir’s family members had been prosecuted was utterly without factual support. The Seventh Circuit reversed because it found that it was "impossible to be confident that Chitay-Pirir’s claim has been fully understood or analyzed."
 
 
Singh Bhathal v. INS, Ninth Circuit
In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that an Immigration Judge to whom a case is transferred has jurisdiction to review an order to reopen issued by the Immigration Judge who originally had jurisdiction over the case. Singh-Bathal had been given written notice by the INS to appear at a deportation hearing in Phoenix; acting according to advice given him by an immigration consultant, Singh-Bathal did not attend the hearing. The Immigration Judge ordered him deported in absentia.
Over a year later, the INS apprehended Singh-Bathal outside of Seattle. Singh-Bathal then made a motion to the Immigration Judge in Phoenix to reopen those proceedings and transfer them to Seattle. The Phoenix Immigration Judge granted the motion. The INS then made a motion before the Seattle Immigration Judge to whom the case had been transferred, requesting an order that the Phoenix Immigration Judge’s decision to reopen was erroneous. Concluding that jurisdiction to do so existed, the Seattle Immigration Judge granted the INS’s motion, finding Singh-Bathal could not reopen his case for failure to motion for a reopening within 180 days of the order of deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Seattle IMMIGRATION JUDGE.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Singh-Bathal argued that the Seattle IMMIGRATION JUDGE lacked jurisdiction to entertain the INS’s motion. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, finding that once the Phoenix IMMIGRATION JUDGE transferred the case to Seattle, the Seattle IMMIGRATION JUDGE gained jurisdiction over the entire case, including jurisdiction to review all prior orders as if he had issued them. For this reason, and because of Singh-Bathal’s failure to make a timely motion to reopen the Phoenix proceedings, the INS’s motion to overrule the order to reopen was properly granted.
 
 
Gonzalez-Murcia v. INS, Ninth Circuit
In this case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the dismissal of an asylum applicant’s application for asylum and withholding of deportation, and remanded to the BIA for further consideration. 
Gonzalez, a native of El Salvador, fled to the U.S. in 1995, following the murder of his father and two of his uncles, all of whom served in the armed forces of the government. Although Gonzalez himself never served in the military, he was an active participant in the ARENA party and supporter of the government. At his asylum hearing he testified that between 1980 and 1994 he received six death threats. Despite finding Gonzalez a credible witness, the IMMIGRATION JUDGE found that because he had not established past persecution and because of changed country conditions, he could not establish a reasonable fear of future persecution.
The well-founded fear of persecution rule has a subjective and an objective component. The subjective component is satisfied when, as in this case, the applicant is found to be a credible witness. Satisfaction of the objective component may be accomplished by evidence of past persecution; in some cases, threats may constitute persecution. The BIA had dismissed Gonzalez’ evidence of death threats against him because he was not able to produce the notes or to identify who sent them. The Ninth Circuit found that "it must be error for the BIA to demand that those engaged in the indelicate craft of persecuting their political enemies sign their threats before a petitioner can make out his or her case for asylum." Of particular importance to the Ninth Circuit and apparently ignored by the BIA was a death threat following the murder of Gonzalez’ uncle in 1994 that provoked him to leave the country. The Ninth Circuit felt "it likely that Gonzalez’ fear of future persecution based on this particular incident was objectively reasonable."
 
 
National Labor Relations Board v. Kolkka, Ninth Circuit
In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer cannot hire undocumented workers and then try to avoid the results of a union election by claiming some of the participants in the election were illegally employed.
Kolkka, the proprietor of Kolkka Tables and Finnish-American Saunas, employs about 50 workers. In May of 1996, the Carpenters Union requested an election among the employees to decide if they should be unionized. Kolkka and the union agreed to the class of persons allowed to vote and the election was held, with the union winning. Kolkka then protested the results of the election, claiming that six of the people who voted were ineligible because they were working without authorization. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found there was no merit to his objections, and ordered him to recognize the union. When Kolkka refused, the NLRB charged him with unfair labor practices and issued summary judgment against him. The proceeding before the Ninth Circuit is the NLRB’s petition for enforcement of its order.
Before the Ninth Circuit, Kolkka argued that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1996 (IRCA) altered the definition of ‘employee’ found in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), an argument the court rejected. The NLRA has never been found to exclude undocumented workers from its definition of employee, and the legislative history of the IRCA specifically says it is not meant to alter the NLRA definition of employee. Therefore, the only basis upon which Kolkka could succeed is repeal by implication, a method of statutory construction that is heavily disfavored. The Ninth Circuit found that harmonious construction of the two statutes required Kolkka’s argument fail: under his interpretation, an employer would be able to manipulate his workforce and avoid unionization by claiming elections were invalid because of the participation of undocumented workers not allowed to work under the IRCA. In short, an employer cannot avoid his obligations under the NLRA by avoiding his obligations under the IRCA.
 
 
Jerezano v. INS, Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit held an Immigration Judge’s refusal to reopen asylum proceedings to be an abuse of discretion and ordered the petition to be reheard. Jerezano, a native of Honduras, fled that country because of fear of persecution based on his membership in a human rights organization. Five years after his illegal entry the INS ordered him to show cause why he should not be deported. At the show cause hearing he admitted deportabilty but said he was going to seek asylum. The asylum hearing was scheduled for 8:30 am on June 17, 1996. Jerezano arrived fifteen to twenty minutes late, explaining to the Immigration Judge, who was still on the bench, that he was late because of a stomach virus that had kept him up all night. Despite this reasonable explanation and the small amount of time by which Jerezano missed his hearing, the IMMIGRATION JUDGE refused to reopen and ordered him to file a formal motion to reopen. This motion was denied by both the IMMIGRATION JUDGE and the BIA on the ground that Jerezano failed to show "exceptional circumstances" warranting reopening. 
The Ninth Circuit found IMMIGRATION JUDGE’s refusal to reopen an abuse of discretion and the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen erroneous. Jerezano was not very late, the IMMIGRATION JUDGE was still on the bench hearing cases, and the delay that would have been caused by hearing Jerezano’s petition was short. In these circumstances, "it seems both harsh and unrealistic to treat as a nonappearance a litigant’s failure to be in the courtroom at the precise moment his case is called."
 
 
Balogun v. INS, Ninth Circuit
In this case the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA affirming an Immigration Judge’s dismissal of Balogun’s application for asylum and withholding of deportation, and remanded to the BIA for further consideration.
Balogun, a Nigerian citizen was a student activist and was deeply involved in demonstrations against the government. She was arrested multiple times, detained and beaten on several occasions. She was threatened with death if she continued her protests and she was pressured by the government and threatened with detention while pregnant if she did not reveal the location of her husband, a leader of a pro-democracy organization. Not surprisingly, she fled to the U.S. in 1991.
The Immigration Judge found her a credible witness, a decision affirmed by the BIA. Thus, Balogun had established the subjective component of the well-founded fear of future persecution claim. The Ninth Circuit found her experience at the hands of the police in Nigeria was persecution on the basis of political opinion. The establishment of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of an objectively well-founded fear of persecution. The evidence the INS submitted not only did not rebut this presumption, it actually tended to further substantiate Balogun’s claim. The state Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1995 stated that "the human rights record in Nigeria has worsened."
The Ninth Circuit found the evidence compelled the conclusion that Balogun has a well-founded fear of future persecution and was statutorily eligible for asylum. It ordered withholding of departure and remanded for the Attorney General to exercise her discretion as to whether to grant asylum.
 
 
Miranda-Espinoza v. INS, Ninth Circuit
In this case the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA affirming an Immigration Judge’s dismissal of Miranda’s application for asylum and withholding of deportation, and remanded to the BIA for further consideration.
Miranda’s family, natives of El Salvador, was the subject of threats, violence and murder for their opposition to FMLN, the guerrilla organization during the country’s civil war. He and his two brothers served in the Salvadoran military. Shortly after the local leader of the FMLN announced that children of families not joining the FMLN would be disappeared, Miranda’s brother was disappeared. After this, the family fled to Guatemala. Miranda’s other brother returned, two years after the peace accord of 1992, believing he would be safe. Witnesses claim he was murdered by the FMLN.
The Immigration Judge found Miranda a credible witness and the BIA did not question this finding. Therefore, the subjective component of the well-founded fear of future persecution was established. The Immigration Judge and BIA found the objective component unprovable because of the tenuous connection between the violence against his family to his political opinions and because of changed conditions in El Salvador. The Ninth Circuit reversed this holding, finding that Miranda’ family was persecuted on the basis of their political opinions, and that Miranda participated in the same activities that led to violence against his family.
The Ninth Circuit found Miranda was statutorily eligible but declined to order withholding of removal, remanding to the BIA for it to determine both this and the propriety of a grant of asylum.
 
 
Lettman v. Reno, Eleventh Circuit
In this case the Eleventh Circuit reversed the deportation order against Lettman, finding he is not deportable, despite a conviction for third-degree murder.
Lettman came to the U.S. from Jamaica in 1968. In 1987 he was convicted of third degree murder. In 1996 the INS instituted deportation proceedings against him on the ground that he had committed an aggravated felony. 
The court first had to determine whether, following the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), it still had jurisdiction. The court found that because Lettman was ordered deported on the basis of an aggravated felony, that order, under the transitional rules of judicial review established by IIRIRA, was not reviewable. However, the court found it still had jurisdiction to decide whether Lettman fit the statutory definition of a deportable aggravated felon. In the court’s opinion, Lettman is not a deportable aggravated felon.
The term "aggravated felony" was first used in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA). The classification applied to all crimes, whether committed before or after the effective date of the statute, but deportation based on conviction of an aggravated felony was allowed only for convictions handed down after the ADAA became effective. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the INS’s argument that IIRIRA made possible deportation based on conviction of an aggravated felony whenever the conviction occurred, finding that the provisions of IIRIRA dealing with retroactivity and aggravated felonies only meant to provide that newly defined aggravated felonies would be retroactive to 1988, when the ADAA became effective.
 
 
Rodriguez v. Shalala, Eleventh Circuit
In this case the Eleventh Circuit upheld the validity of provisions of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act that limited the classes of immigrants who could qualify for federal welfare benefits. The court denied the claim of the plaintiffs that the law violated equal protection by unfairly discriminating among classes of aliens. 
Prior to 1996, immigrants were eligible for federal food stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on the same basis as citizens. The 1996 law changed this by creating 14 categories of immigrants, "qualified aliens" who are eligible for both food stamps and SSI, or one or the other, and by placing time limits on some categories. The plaintiffs argued that the law should be reviewed with strict scrutiny, and argued in the alternative that if the proper standard of review was for rationality, the law failed that test. 
Relying on Mathews v. Diaz, a Supreme Court case decided in 1976, the Eleventh Circuit found that when a statute, such as this, discriminates between classes of aliens, the discrimination need be only rationally related to the legislative goal. Because Congress has no constitutional obligation to provide any welfare benefits to immigrants, it follows that it can draw lines around the classes of immigrants it does wish to receive benefits. In this case, benefits are extended to groups whom it is reasonable to believe Congress wished to extend additional benefits, such as legal permanent residents with a long work history, military veterans, asylees and refugees.
Because the classifications made by the 1996 Welfare Reform Act rationally relate to the congressional goal of cutting welfare expenditures and are not wholly without a reasonable basis, the statute survives constitutional challenge.
 
Yue Yu v. Brown, District Court of New Mexico
In this case, the District Court refused the grant the INS’s request for dismissal of this writ of mandamus case seeking to compel the INS to make a decision about plaintiff’s application for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status that had been pending for over one year.
SIJ creates a special category of immigrant visas not subject to any numerical limitation for unmarried minors who are dependent on a court, and allows for immediate adjustment to legal permanent resident status upon receipt of the visa. The plaintiff, who met all the requirements for SIJ, filed an application in August of 1996. The INS has yet to take action, thus leading to this suit and the plaintiff is seeking an order that the INS adjudicate the petition. 
The court found the appropriate test to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the claim consisted of three parts: first, the defendant, the INS, must owe a duty to the plaintiff, second, that duty must be mandatory, third, the plaintiff must establish a clear right to relief. In this case, because the plaintiff was among the class of people intended to be benefited by SIJ, the INS owed her a duty. The court found this duty is mandatory, that while the court cannot compel a specific decision on the merits, a decision that rests within the discretion of the INS, it can compel the INS to make that decision. The lack of a prescribed time limit within the statute does not, the court found, make the necessity of a decision any less mandatory, for it is within the power of the court to prescribe a reasonable time limit. Finally, the plaintiff had established that she had a clear right to relief: she has no other remedy because there is no agency decision to review, and the length of delay, over one year, is prima facie unreasonable. 
The case will now proceed to trial.
 
 
Hermanowski v. Reno, District Court of Rhode Island
The district court granted the petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus, finding his detention violated due process.
Hermanowski, a Polish citizen, came to the U.S. in 1973, at age 15. He married a U.S. citizen and had two children, and became a petty criminal. In 1992, after racking up convictions for assault, mugging and drug possession, the INS began deportation proceedings. In 1992 an Immigration Judge ordered him deported, and in 1994 the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. During this period, Hermanowski was serving a sentence in state prison. When he was released in September of 1996, he was taken into custody by the INS, where he has remained since, for 28 months, because the Polish government refuses to issue him travel papers. Despite two years of effort by both the INS and the state Department, the Polish government has refused to alter its position.
The district court found that under the First Circuit precedent, Goncalves v. Reno, it still had jurisdiction to hear the petition for habeas corpus despite the jurisdictional bars created by the two laws in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. This jurisdiction, the court found, included the power to hear Hermanowski’s constitutionally based challenge to his continuing detention.
 
Because detention is not criminal punishment, but is only an incident to the administrative deportation proceeding, the detention must actually advance governmental interests. This is a factual inquiry, to which several factors are relevant, including the length of detention, the likelihood of deportation, the potential total length of detention, and the danger posed to the community is the petitioner is released. Weighing these factors, the court found that because the Polish government appeared unlikely to reverse itself with regard to Hermanowski, his detention would be indefinite, and excessive in light of the goals to be accomplished by detention. Detention is an incident to deportation. As the situation currently stands, Hermanowski will not be deported, and there is therefore no justification for continued detention.
 
 
In re Roldan, Board of Immigration Appeals
In this case the Board of Immigration Appeals found that the definition of ‘conviction’ found in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) overturned a long series of cases in which the Board had given effect to state rehabilitative provisions that had purported to overturn the original conviction.
Roldan, a citizen of Mexico, pled guilty to a first offense of simple possession of a controlled substance. He was ordered to pay a fine and sentenced to three years on probation, but no judgment of guilt was officially entered. Within one year, Roldan’s guilty plea was vacated, in accordance with Idaho state law. However, deportation proceedings had already begun. 
After IIRIRA, a conviction, for immigration purposes, is defined as "a formal judgment of guilt . . . entered by a court, or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contedere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed." This new provision, the BIA found, eliminated the need to consider a state’s rehabilitative procedures that eliminate the consequences of a conviction. Under this new, strict, definition of conviction, a person can be considered convicted for immigration purposes when they would not be considered convicted under state law; such treatment is, according to the BIA, permissible in light of "the prevailing congressional policy of strict treatment toward criminal aliens in deportation proceedings." 
All the states and the federal government provide for some form of expungement for minor first offenses. Following this decision, these provisions will not be given effect, and regardless of the ultimate outcome, once the alien receives some sort of penalty, he is considered convicted for immigration purposes. This ruling does not apply to convictions reversed on appeal or successfully overturned on collateral attack, such as a habeas corpus proceeding.
 
 
In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, Board of Immigration Appeals
The respondent was in deportation proceedings in 1995 based on conviction of possession of a piece of false identification with the intent to use it to perpetrate an immigration fraud. The BIA found this offense to fall directly within section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), making offenses related to the use of fraud to obtain immigration benefits grounds for inadmissibility. Thus the respondent requires a waiver of inadmissibility.
Because a request for a waiver of inadmissibility is a request for prospective relief, it falls within the rule of retroactivity created by the Attorney General in Matter of Soriano; thus the respondent was required to demonstrate extreme hardship would occur to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident were he deported. 
While noting that the test for extreme hardship is not fixed or inflexible, the BIA did list some factors to be considered. Among these are "the presence of lawful permanent resident of U.S. citizen family ties to this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the U.S., the conditions in the country or country to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties to such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and, finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate." Applying these factors to this case, the BIA found respondent failed to establish extreme hardship. His wife became a U.S. citizen in 1996; both she and he maintained strong family ties in Mexico. Because they were married when he was already in deportation proceedings, she knew of the possibility of being sent back to Mexico. Neither he nor she had significant financial ties to the U.S., and would not suffer any greater economic hardships than usually accompany deportation.
 
 
INS v. Aguirre
On March 3rd, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in INS v. Aguirre, a case that will have a far reaching impact on U.S. refugee policy. Juan Anibal Aguirre entered the U.S. illegally in 1993, following years of leading student protests against the Guatemalan government. As part of the protests, he participated in the burning of at least 10 buses and other, more minor, vandalism. 
The Immigration Judge granted Aguirre’s request for withholding of deportation and asylum, finding he had a reasonable fear of persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, finding his crimes in Guatemala were serious and nonpolitical, thus rendering him ineligible for withholding of deportation. The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA, holding that a court should weigh of the seriousness of the crimes with the likelihood of persecution, and should consider the overall context in which the crime occurred. 
During the argument the Justices gave some indication of which side of the issue they would come down on. Justice Antonin Scalia stated he opinion that it is "extraordinary that we take into this country people who have committed any crime at all, even for political reasons." In response, the INS attorney suggested that someone who had attempted to assassinate Hitler would not automatically be denied asylum. This led the Justices into a general discussion on the political nature of assassination, leading Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to question whether a failed assassin of Saddam Hussein would be denied asylum. Justice John Paul Stevens then said "As soon as you have any political ingredient, it can’t be a nonpolitical crime. The INS responded that the focus should be kept on the crime, maintaining that "political motivation alone doesn’t make it a political crime."
Aguirre’s attorneys said "asylum law is not based on someone deserving something. The idea is not to reward good behavior or punish bad behavior, it is to provide safe haven. They took the position that the test for determining whether a crime is political should be whether it was "out of proportion to his political goals," and that under this test, his crimes, were political.
The Supreme Court has denied certirorai in two cases dealing with the retroactivity of IIRIRA, and vacated and remanded another. Certororai was denied in Reno v. Goncalves, from the First Circuit, and Reno v. Navas, from the Second Circuit, both of which reached the conclusion that Congress did not intend to make the provisions barring judicial review of deportation orders retroactive. The Court vacated and remanded INS v. Magana-Pizano to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, decided last month. The Ninth Circuit had reached the same result of non-retroactivity and the First and Second Circuits, but by a different line of reasoning. The Ninth Circuit found Congress did intend the provisions in question to be retroactive, but found that such an intent was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. It may be that the decision was vacated to give the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to reach the same result without making a constitutionally based decision. 
The orders were greeted with approval by immigrant advocates, who see it as a vindication of the right to judicial review. While in areas covered by the First and Second Circuits (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont,) judicial reivew of deportation orders is now the law, the Supreme Court’s denial of certoriari is not a decision on the merits of the case, and it could be reviewed again in the future.