US v. Perez-Lopez

US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit

No. 02-30358 D.C. No. CR-02-00150-1-OMP

Appellant was a 39-year-old native of Mexico with a third-grade education and very limited English skills.  In 2002, he entered a conditional guilty plea to a single count of producing false identification documents in violation of 18 USC § 1028(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

The arrest came after a search of Appellant’s hotel room revealed items that could be used to make fake identification. Upon entering the room, police reported having a translator present who presented the Appellant with his Miranda rights, at which time he signed the Miranda card, as well as consented to a search of his room.  Although the translator’s stories varied slightly from the officer’s report, the Appellant’s story differed dramatically.  He stated that the police pushed their way into the room without consent and told him to sign the Miranda card or else he would be arrested.

The District Court denied the Appellant’s motion to suppress, citing the correlation of the police officer and the translator’s testimony. The Court found that the Appellant signed the cards for consent and Miranda warnings, indicating that he had knowingly waived his rights. On appeal, Appellant claims that his motion to suppress should have been granted because (1) he gave no consent to the officers to enter his motel room; (2) his consent to their search was not voluntary; and (3) his statements at the motel were preceded by a flawed Miranda warning. 

On the first issue, the Court of Appeals held that sufficient commonalities exist in the officer and the translator’s stories to justify the district court’s chosen view and it was within the district court’s discretion to credit the translator’s testimony that Perez-Lopez orally consented to the officers’ entry.

For the second issue, the district court based its findings on the five non-exclusive factors listed in US v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).  One of these factors, whether Miranda warnings were given, was used by the district court to demonstrate that the Appellant’s consent to search voluntary. The district court had found that the Miranda warning made the consent voluntary, even though the Miranda warning was read after the search began.  The Court of Appeals found the district court’s reliance on the Miranda warnings in relation to this issue was in error.  “When a Miranda warning follows rather than precedes the purported consent, it cannot support the voluntariness of the consent.”   The Court of Appeals remanded on this issue for the court to reconsider the validity of the search by conducting a new the “totality of all the circumstances” analysis described in U.S. v. Schneckloth, 412 US 218. 

On the third issue, the Court held that the district court’s analysis of the sufficiency of the Miranda warning was also inconsistent with previous case law.  The Spanish translation that was offered to the Appellant implied that a person who lacks funds is not automatically appointed an attorney, but rather must solicit the court for one. 

The Court of Appeals held that the warning given to the Appellant was constitutionally infirm because it did not convey to him the government’s obligation to appoint an attorney for indigent accused.  Previous courts held that the Miranda rights must be unambiguous.  Therefore, the Miranda warning as interpreted by precedent led to reversal of the district court’s approval of the warning given to the Appellant.  Therefore, the Appellant’s post-Miranda incriminating statements should have been suppressed as improperly obtained.

*****

Bismillah Miah v. John Ashcroft

The Petitioner, Bismillah Miah, a national of Bangladesh, petitioned for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his petition for political asylum and withholding of removal.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that because the BIA held that the Petitioner met the burden of proof required by the IJ, the BIA should have conducted an independent corroboration analysis or remanded the case to the IJ to conduct another corroboration analysis. 

The BIA instructed the IJ to consider whether several factors on remand.  First, the IJ must consider whether specific corroboration of the Petitioner's claims is credible.  If the IJ does consider the corroboration credible, then the IJ must consider whether corroboration is reasonable.  If so, the IJ will then need to determine whether the Petitioner presented sufficient information corroborating the relevant facts.  If yes, the Petitioner has sustained his burden of proof.  If not, then the IJ must determine whether the Petitioner adequately explained his failure to do so.  If yes, then the Petitioner also sustains his burden of proof and is entitled to political asylum and withholding of removal.