Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, Fifth Circuit
Ricardo Renteria-Gonzalez, a citizen of Mexico, was granted temporary resident status after the 1986 amnesty. In 1989, he pled guilty to charges of transporting undocumented immigrants and was sentenced to six months in prison and three years on probation. The court also issued a recommendation against deportation. Despite this recommendation, the INS began deportation proceedings in 1990. The proceedings were based not on the conviction, but on the INS’s claim that Renteria had unlawfully entered the US at the time of the transportation offense. Because Renteria’s temporary resident status had not been revoked, the INS withdrew the notice of deportation, terminated his residency status. Renteria appealed this decision, which was reversed in 1992. He also successfully applied to the court that convicted him to have the conviction vacated.
In 1994, the INS again began deportation proceedings, this time both on Renteria’s alleged unlawful entry and on the transportation conviction. An immigration judge found Renteria deportable, and he appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which, after a seven year delay, affirmed the deportation. Renteria then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The court first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to review the deportation order. Under the rules applicable in this case, which went into effect in 1996, federal courts cannot review final orders of deportation based on a number of criminal offenses, including the offense of which Renteria was convicted. The INS argued that this provision applied to Renteria even though his conviction occurred years before 1996. Renteria argued both that his conviction could not be considered an aggravated felony because it was not one when he was convicted, and that because the conviction was vacated, it could not be the basis for deportation.
The Fifth Circuit found that in vacating the criminal conviction, the district court had committed a number of errors, foremost among which was that it lacked the authority to do so. In vacating the conviction, the judge relied on the previous recommendation against deportation, but in 1990, Congress rescinded all such recommendations, regardless of when they were issued. However, the INS could not attack the validity of the vacation before the circuit court, which turned then to the INS argument that for immigration purposes, a vacated convicted carries the same weight as a conviction still on the books. The Fifth Circuit agreed with this argument, finding that the definition of “conviction” found in the Immigration and Nationality Act encompasses any formal, final finding of guilt, regardless of whether it is later vacated. The court found strong evidence for this position in the fact that Congress, in 1996, included a definition of conviction in the INA. What constituted a conviction for immigration purposes had been much litigated, and that Congress did not make an exception for vacated convictions was, the court found, proof that such convictions were not to be given special treatment.
The court then addressed whether the immigration transportation conviction was an aggravated felony and found that it was not. Because of when Renteria was placed in deportation proceedings, transitional rules adopted in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act were in effect. Under these rules, the expanded definition of aggravated felony that was also adopted in IIRAIRA is not applied. The court then examined the disposition of Renteria’s case and found that it was fair and that Renteria had no basis upon which to overturn the order of deportation against him.
The opinion is available online at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0160364p.pdf.
Reinforced Earth Company v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Juan Carlos Astudillo, an undocumented immigrant from Mexico, was injured on the job while working for the Reinforced Earth Company. He had secured employment by providing fraudulent immigration documents. Following his injury, he filed a claim for workers’ compensation. At the hearing it was determined that Astudillo’s undocumented status did not prevent him from receiving compensation, and thus granted him compensation. Reinforced Earth appealed, and the decision was affirmed. The company then appealed to state court, arguing that because Astudillo could not be legally employed in the US, he was not entitled to compensation. The court rejected this argument, and affirmed the award of compensation. Reinforced Earth then appealed to the state supreme court.
The company urged the court to create a public policy exception to rules governing workers’ compensation to prevent undocumented workers from receiving it. The court, noting that courts are generally hesitant to base legal rules on “public policy” concerns, declined to impose such a rule.
The opinion is available online at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/pennsylvaniastatecases/supreme/j-113-2002oaj.pdf.
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