Chambers v. Reno, Fourth Circuit
Dean Chambers, a citizen of Jamaica, became a permanent resident of the US in 1978, when he was two years old. In 1994, after trial, he was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to four years in jail. Part of the sentence was suspended, and Chambers spent only 18 months in prison. In 1997, the INS began deportation proceedings on the basis that the conviction was an aggravated felony. An immigration judge agreed, and, finding Chambers ineligible for any form of relief, ordered him deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and Chambers appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
Chambers’ offense was not an aggravated felony before the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act greatly expanded the list. After that change, his offense became an aggravated felony. On appeal, Chambers argued that because his conviction occurred prior to this change, the law in effect before the change should apply to him.
In 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that immigrants who had been convicted through a guilty plea prior to the change in the law must be allowed the opportunity to pursue any relief that may have been available to them at the time of their conviction. The issue for the Fourth Circuit was whether the reasoning behind this decision should be extended to a case where the immigrant was convicted following a trial. The court found that it could not be. In cases involving guilty pleas, it is easy to assume that the guilty plea was entered in hopes of reducing potential immigration consequences of a conviction. This hope, the court found, is not present when the immigrant chooses to go to trial. In essence, according to the court, an immigrant who goes to trial is not motivated by the desire to maintain eligibility for discretionary relief from deportation, but to avoid conviction entirely. Therefore, the court upheld the prior rulings.
The opinion is available online at http://www.ilw.com/lawyers/immigdaily/cases/2002,1016-chambers.pdf.
Chang v. INS, Ninth Circuit
Steve Kie Chang, a citizen of South Korea and permanent resident of the US since 1975, when he was five years old, pled guilty in 1998 to one federal count of bank fraud after being charged with passing several bad checks. In the plea agreement, the amount of the fraud was emphasized, $605.30. Chang was sentenced to eight months in prison and ordered to pay restitution of more than $32,000. This amount included the bad checks that he had passed, but to which he had not pled guilty. After the conviction, the INS began deportation proceedings, alleging that Chang had committed an aggravated felony, specifically an offense involving fraud in which the victim lost more than $10,000. The immigration judge agreed, and Chang was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and Chang appealed. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal, and then Chang filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition, and Chang appealed again to the Ninth Circuit.
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether Chang’s offense was an aggravated felony. In deportation, statutes are read very narrowly. The statute under which the conviction was obtained must clearly encompass the deportable offense, or if it does not, the details of the offense must clearly fall within the deportation statute. The statute under which Chang was convicted did not mention a dollar amount required for conviction, and therefore did not clearly fall under the deportation provision. Looking at the specifics of Chang’s offense, the court found it also did not fall within the deportation statute. While it was accepted by both Chang and the government that he had defrauded people out of more than $30,000, the actual conviction mentioned only $605.30, clearly not an aggravated felony. The court also rejected the INS’ argument that it could look to the presentence report prepared by the government, in which the actually amount of the fraud was listed. While avoiding a categorical statement that the INS could never look at the presentence report, the court found that to do so when the plea agreement left no question as to whether an offense was deportable was improper. Therefore, the court ordered that the writ of habeas corpus be granted.
The opinion is available online at http://www.ilw.com/lawyers/immigdaily/cases/2002,1015-chang.pdf.
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